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WHAT DOES THE BANK OF THE SOUTH
REALLY SIGNIFY?
Christine St. Germain*
N an effort to curb the influence of Washington-based lending institu-
tions, most notably the World Bank and the International Monetary
Fund (IMF), to promote his own idea of twenty-first century social-
ism, and to aid in Latin American integration, Venezuelan President
Hugo Chavez has proposed to create the "Bank of the South," a regional
development bank run by Latin Americans for the benefit of Latin
Americans.' His proposed Bank is just the latest venture for Chavez,
who is seeking to spread his own blend of "military populism and neo-
Marxist statism" across Latin America.2 Since being elected president of
Venezuela in 1998, Chavez has "nationalized private assets, forced the
departure of U.S. companies, cracked down on the media and other op-
position outlets, and funded his own corps of leftist candidates through-
out Latin America."'3 Recently he proposed a Constitutional amendment
that would allow him to serve as President for life.4
Chavez refers to both the World Bank and the IMF as the United
States' imperialist tools, and vows that with the creation of the Bank of
the South, Latin America will no longer be forced to rely on Washington,
the World Bank, or the IMF.5 Chavez's envisions his anti-American po-
litical project as an alternative to the World Bank and the IMF for South
America.6 "In a clear departure from the undemocratic and paternalistic
governance structure of the World-Bank which based voting privileges on
financial contribution, giving the US Treasury the largest share of the
vote, the Bank of the South promises that no one country will be the 'sole
*Christine St. Germain is from New Orleans, La. She graduated from Louisiana
State University, suma cum laude, with degrees in both Political Science and His-
tory. She is currently in her third year of law school at Southern Methodist
University
1. Sara Miller Llana & Matthew Clark, Latin America's answer to the World Bank
and IMF, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, July 11, 2007.
2. Venezuela: The rise of the "Boligarchs," THE ECONOMIST, Issue 950, August 11,
2007.
3. Nancy Soderberg, US must tell Fernandez to be more Responsible, FIN. TIMES, Sep-
tember 9, 2007.
4. Id.
5. Id.; Karen Krebsbach, Bank of the South Draws Mixed Reviews, US BANKER, Sep-
tember 1, 2007.
6. Venezuela and South America: Hugo Chavez moves into Banking, THE EcoNo-
MIST, Issue 950, May 12, 2007.
836 LAW AND BUSINESS REVIEW OF THE AMERICAS [Vol. 14
owner."' 7 It is speculated that the voting privileges within the Bank of
the South will be allocated based on financial need, rather than financial
contribution or political clout. 8 Much like the World Bank or the IMF,
the Bank of the South would supply the funding for development
projects, but they would come without the conditions that are normally
associated with IMF or World Bank loans.9 These conditions "favor
stringent controls on public spending, [have] a heavy emphasis on priva-
tizing public industries, and often favor United States and European in-
terests, since [they] control the multilateral institutions' staffs and policies
because of their large contributions."' 10 The supposed goal of the re-
gional development bank is to finance social projects, such as health and
education systems in Bolivia, with little policy strings attached."
Another goal of the Bank is to deepen the financial and economic inte-
gration of South America. 12 In order to accomplish this, Chavez will
need to recruit a qualified staff and choose a proper funding model.13
Although the idea has been rebuffed by countries such as Brazil, it has
been suggested that member countries use part of their own foreign
reserves to capitalize the bank.14 Chavez already has complex and far-
reaching plans for South American integration.' 5
He hopes to build a 5,000-mile natural gas pipeline from Venezuela to
Argentina, and he is creating the Petrosur regional oil company as a con-
glomerate of state-owned oil ventures. He has launched TeleSUR as a
regional television broadcaster ... [And] He is also the main proponent
of what he calls the Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas, a regional
free-trade arrangement to rival the US's failed Free Trade Area of the
Americas (FIAA) hemispheric trade pact. 16
Chavez's recent withdrawal from the World Bank and the IMF was
seen largely as a symbolic move for Venezuela since they have already
paid off their $3.3 billion debt owed to the World Bank, and the IMF had
not had an office in Caracas since 2006.17 Argentina, Brazil, and Ecuador
are also no longer in debt to the IMF, and other Latin American coun-
tries are hoping to follow suit.' 8 Ecuador has also expelled the Bank's
representative and declared him persona non grata for allegedly failing to
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release pledged funds. 19 These actions have the opportunity to demon-
strate to other developing countries, which have become "increasingly
frustrated by their dependence on capital-and influence-from the
United States and Europe," that not being a part of the World Bank and
the IMF is a viable option. 20 This sentiment is strengthened by a rise in
commodity prices and a flood of international liquidity, which has al-
lowed most countries in the region to increase their current surpluses,
strengthen their reserves, and decrease their dependency on the Washing-
ton-based multilaterals. 2 1 Nancy Soderber, writing a commentary to the
Washington Times, said this of Mr. Chavez:
Mr. Chavez spreads his oil money and rhetoric about 21st century
socialism around the region, tempting Venezuela's neighbors to
thumb their noses at 'neoliberalism' and follow [him]. He hopes that
under his tutelage, new leaders in Latin America will repudiate their
debt obligations, buck foreign contracts, nationalize foreign assets
and side with Mr. Chavez and his brand of fiery anti-American popu-
lism-cum-socialism over responsible commercial relationships. 22
Venezuela is the only country other than Cuba and North Korea that is
not a member of either the World Bank or the IMF.23 Although Vene-
zuela currently has no need for these institutions because of its increased
oil wealth, some fear that other poorer countries in Latin America - such
as Bolivia, Ecuador, and Nicaragua - may also be tempted to withdraw.24
This is not the first falling out between Venezuela and the IMF or the
World Bank.25 In 1989, riots erupted in Caracas and throughout Vene-
zuela after a series of IMF prescribed austerity measures that caused sub-
stantial increases in subsidized gasoline prices and public transportation
fares.26 Tragically, over 300 people were killed and dozens more injured,
businesses were destroyed, and dozens of buses were burned in the
streets during the riots.27
Although the World Bank has provided trillions of dollars in loans to
developing nations, and in Latin America, financing by the bank accounts
for 20 percent of multilateral lending, Latin American leaders see the
money being attached to conditions that interfere with their governmen-
tal sovereignty. 28 It has been said that "there have been few more assidu-
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ous customers of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank
than Latin American governments. Even as they privately welcomed the
economic rationality that comes with loans from the fund and the bank,
the region's leaders often blamed them for unpopular but needed mea-
sures." 29 As a result, many Latin Americans revile the multilateral insti-
tutions.30 In the last five years, the IMF's commitment to Latin America
has fallen from $50 billion to less than $3 billion.31 Latin American coun-
tries have also been borrowing between one-fourth and one-half less
from the World Bank in the last eight years.32 Venezuela is not the only
nation to feel this way; there is growing resentment against "the Washing-
ton consensus" in many parts of the developing world.33 African coun-
tries are now jumping at the chance for Chinese aid because it comes with
considerably fewer policy prescriptions and conditions.34 The IMF is also
not the most favored institution in Argentina, one of Venezuela's
staunchest allies, who largely misplaced blame on the fund for its eco-
nomic collapse in 2001.3 5 Argentina later disregarded IMF advice by de-
faulting on its debt and then experienced robust economic recovery,
solidifying the country's distrust of the institution.36 Bolivian President
Evo Morales has also expressed his distaste for the World Bank describ-
ing it as a "one-sided organization which protects big business inter-
ests. ' 37 Equador's President Rafael Correa also has strong words for the
World Bank: he charges that the bank suspended the disbursement of a
$100 million loan that had already been approved in an effort to "strong-
arm his administration into not increasing the amount of money it draws
from an oil stabilization fund, and dedicates to social spending. '38
Many Latin American countries are finding new ways to secure loans
for development projects, often turning to private capital or other lending
institutions, including the Andean Development Corporation (CAF) for
funding. 39 Countries are attracted to these other sources, fueled by a
market flushed with capital, because they are easily accessible.40 "These
other lenders, attracted to the region by its increasing wealth, are also
free of the baggage that burdens the multilateral institutions, especially
their role in Argentina's 2001 economic collapse and the [recent] scandal
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surrounding World Bank President Paul Wolfowitz. ' '4 1 The reaction
against the IMF and the World Bank represent a popular rejection of the
idea that foreign aid must be conditioned upon the implementation of
privatization programs, which has failed to produce much of a reduction
in the poverty rate.42 There has now been a clear political backlash from
the fact that poverty has persisted in Latin America in the face of the
World Bank and IMF policy prescriptions.43 Twelve presidential races
were held in Latin America in 2006. 4 4 Leftwing candidates were victori-
ous in half of those elections, and in another four races leftist parties
made substantial progress.45 Economic policy was a pervasive theme of
the elections, with the "candidates who were critical of the conservative,
pro-business, free-market economic policies of their predecessors [faring]
much better than supporters of the Washington-favoured status quo."
4 6
Not only did Venezuela withdraw from the World Bank and the IMF,
and is now encouraging other countries to do so as well, but "[President
Hugo] Chavez's government is now offering more direct state funding to
Latin America and the Caribbean than the United States. ' 47 While
"Venezuela has pledged more than $8.8 billion in aid, financing, and en-
ergy funding"; the latest figure shows that the United States has sent only
"$3 billion in grants and loans."'48 There is a difference in the type of aid
disbursed by the two nations. 49 In an effort to keep a low profile and to
abide by strict guidelines, the United States' distribution of aid is often
distributed under the guise of another institution, that way the recipients
are unaware of its origin.50 Alternatively, Venezuelan aid favors left-
ward-leaning nations that support Chavez's vision of a more independent
Latin America, and often comes with few strings attached. 5 1 An example
of the disparity in spending between the two countries occurred when
flooding ravaged Bolivia this past year. 52 "The U.S. provided $1.5 million
in a planeload of supplies and cash," which seems like a drop in the
bucket compared to the $800 million pledged by the Venezuelan govern-
ment and the teams sent to help the victims for weeks at a time.53 Vene-
zuela is also offering help to other South American countries, including
Argentina, backing jointly sold bonds, and purchasing "$2.5 billion of Ar-
gentine government bonds, [which] helped Argentina replenish its
41. Sanchez, supra note 32, at B6.
42. Id.
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reserves after it repaid $9.5 billion of debt to the IMF in late 2005." 54
Chavez's motivating reason for helping Argentina is to try "and end their
dependence on the IMF."'55
Although Chavez claims that his aid comes without strings attached,
Richard Feinberg, professor of international political economy at the
University of California in San Diego says that there is still "Chavez con-
ditionality." 56 Chavez conditionality means choosing his version of 21st-
century socialism over the traditional Bretton Woods conditionality. 57
The traditional model includes many of the "harsh economic reforms that
have left Latin American voters dissatisfied and looking for more radical
solutions to the region's socioeconomic problems. '58 As a result, many
Latin American governments adhere to "Chavez conditionality" and con-
tinually accept aid from Venezuela in exchange for echoing Chavez's po-
litical rhetoric, and these countries often find themselves "stuck between
Washington and Caracas in a region where the United States remains the
number-one trading and investment partner. ' 59 One such example is the
current situation in Ecuador. 60
Ecuador has become an important front in President Chavez's war to
increase Venezuela's regional influence.61 Unlike other oil-exporting
countries, Ecuador has not experienced economic growth from rising oil
prices; in fact, their economy has slowed over the last quarter from 4
percent, to 2.2 percent. 62 "Venezuela has offered help to refine some of
Ecuador's crude oil and has supported Ecuador's plan to return to
OPEC, which it left in the early 1990s after it fell behind in paying
dues. '63 Venezuela is offering to give Ecuador as much as $500 million
dollars, while Ecuador, at the same time, is threatening to default on $10
billion dollars worth of overseas debt.64 Extending such offers enable
Venezuela to take over the role of the IMF as the lender of last resort. 65
Coincidentally, Ecuador has been a loud supporter of Chavez's Bank of
the South.66 And although there are echoes of Mr. Chavez's policies in
Ecuador's proposal to "regulate" news organizations and their opposition
to the "renewal of an agreement allowing the United States to maintain a
military base in Manta," they have also skillfully resisted the type of Ven-
54. Christopher Swann, Chavez Exploits Oil Wealth to Push IMF out of Latin America,
INT'L HERALD TRIB., Mar. 2, 2007, at 16.
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ezuelan aid offered to countries such as Bolivia and Nicaragua. 67
In Latin America, there has been a gradual division into pro- and anti-
Chavez nations, and these divisions also mirror differing attitudes con-
cerning Washington, Chavez's nemesis.68 "Many officials voice concerns
that creation of the bank will serve to highlight, if not exacerbate, the
growing ideological divisions in the region between left-leaning and more
conservative governments, and between those with cool and those with
warm relations with Washington. ' '6 9 These regional divisions have risen
as a result of "the radicalization of Venezuela and the growth of an anti-
American camp - backed since last year by elections in Bolivia, Ecuador
and Nicaragua. '70
It may not be that clear-cut. But imperial overreach by the Bush
Administration, and the Iraq debacle, have created a power vacuum
that Chavez ... is exploiting. [Chavez], who seems to fancy himself
as Castro's successor, has big plans, casting himself as a populist
leader of a revolution, that, fuelled by petro-dollars, will make Vene-
zuela the linchpin of a rejuvenated continent with elected left-gov-
ernments in Brazil, Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador, and Argentina. 7'
The United States has made an effort to counter Chavez's aggressive grab
for regional influence by promoting "a year of engagement with Latin
America... but many wonder if it is too little too late."'7 2
"The diverging views of the project point to the contrasts between Bra-
zil's president, Luiz de Silva, a longtime socialist who embraced market-
friendly policies once in power... and Mr. Chavez, who favors a more
assertive role for Venezuela's government in guiding economic policy
here and elsewhere in the region. ' 73 Brazil and Venezuela have differing
ideas about the proposed Bank of the South.7 4 The location of the
Bank's headquarters is one such example.7 5 Brazil would like the head-
quarters to be located in a neutral country, instead of the Venezuelan
strong holds of Caracas and Buenos Aires. 76 Additionally, their views on
the role of the bank differ; Chavez's wants the Bank to replace the IMF
and World Bank by usurping its role in the region and financing infra-
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The debate over the Bank is evidence of a larger power struggle be-
tween Brazil and Venezuela. 79 And while Brazil's President maintains a
good relationship with President Bush, he also maintains a close relation-
ship with Mr. Chavez. 80 Recently, though, Brazil has begun to distance
itself from Venezuela on several key issues. 81 In March, Brazil's commu-
nications minister made a comparison between Venezuela's state run tele-
vision system and Cuba's. 82 This is the closest Brazil has come to publicly
recognizing and criticizing the apparent anti-democratic drift of Mr. Cha-
vez's Presidency.83 Brazil has also rebuked Bolivia's treatment of Pe-
trobras, Brazil's state owned energy firm.84 Last year, Bolivia's president
"nationalized" oil and gas, an idea backed by Mr. Chavez, which forced
Petrobras to accept harsh new terms for its Bolivian operations. 85 Mr.
Morales then issued a decree granting Bolivia's state-owned YPFB a mo-
nopoly on the sales from Petrobras's two Bolivian refineries, basically
usurping their cash flow. 86 At this point, the Brazilian government spoke
out against the property grab saying that it could hurt the relationship
between the two countries. 87 Petrobras then issued an ultimatum that
Bolivia either had to buy the two refineries for a fair price or face inter-
national arbitration. 88 Experts say that the "ostensibly warm relations
between Chavez and Lula mask an intense competition for political and
economic influence ... Venezuela has used oil revenue to win allies, but
Lula is employing diplomacy and his prestige as an up-from-the-factory
former union leader who is now Brazil's widely respected head of
state." 89 "The Brazilian president has been a strong proponent of South
American integration, a vaguely defined goal that most leaders on the
continent endorse in theory. But Lula has departed from Chavez's anti-
U.S. vision of integration, failing to embrace, for instance the Venezue-
lan's plan for a 'Bank of the South."' 90 The emergence of a pro-Chavez,
anti-Washington alliance in Latin America has caused concern within the
Bush administration, and as a reaction they have warmly embraced Lula
as a moderate leftist and elevated him as a role model for the region.91
The two countries recently traded visits, symbolizing efforts to expand
Lula's profile in order to offset Chavez's ever-increasing image.92
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Recently, Chavez toured South and Central America in an effort to
promote Venezuela's entry into MERCOUSUR, a South American re-
gional trade block, and to offer energy aid and financial deals to its al-
lies. 93 MERCOUSUR, the Common Market of the South, is being hailed
as "one of the clearest expressions of the 'new regionalism"' spreading
across Latin America. 94 Chavez envisions Venezuela's addition to the
trade bloc as the solidification of a grand South American alliance, cre-
ated to counteract U.S. dominance.95 However,
Venezuela's pending entry into the Mercosur trade bloc may not
come to fruition. Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez's criticism of
Brazil's Congress has already held up approval of Venezuela's mem-
bership. But Mr. Chavez's more recent assertion that Brazil's legisla-
ture is acting on behalf of the US in delaying Venezuela's entry into
the trade group (comprised of Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay and Uru-
guay as full members) may have been the final straw. The head of
the Brazilian Senate's foreign relations committee, Heraclito Fortes,
called the statement "unacceptable" and said Brazil's Congress will
not be pressured. At the same time, Mr. Chavez has hinted that he
might withdraw his application to join Mercosur entirely, possibly to
return to the fold of another trading group, the Andean
Community. 96
In the last two years there has been a resurgence of resource national-
ism in Latin America "as wide income inequalities-amid soaring world
commodity prices-have prompted demand for a larger share of the
windfall from energy resources. '9 7 Economic issues have come to the
forefront and replaced political ones in the fight over influence.98 Chavez
has used expanded oil revenues to exert his financial power, and in turn,
governmental intervention in Venezuela has become the most radical in
all of Latin America.99 In the past few years Chavez has "nationalized
telecommunications, electricity and oil companies; forged a single social-
ist party for his followers; deepened alliances with countries like Cuba
and Iran; and sped the distribution of billions of dollars for local gov-
erning entities called communal councils."'1 Chavez insists that the pri-
mary objective of his so-called petroleum socialism is to help the poor,
93. Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez Signs Multiple Regional Agreements, NOTISUR
SOUTH AM. POL. AND ECON. AFFAIRS, August 24, 2007.
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who make up a majority of Venezuela's population.' 0 ' Even though he
claims to be pursuing endogenous development, Venezuelan farmers and
manufacturers are struggling to compete with cheaper imports.10 2 In
Chavez's own government subsidized grocery stores, imported Gouda
and Emmenthal cheeses have replaced local dairy products, and "while
the importers who supply [the grocery store] have grown rich ... Vene-
zuela's ranchers are becoming extinct, threatened by expropriations, land
invasions and price controls, as well as by extortion and kidnappings by
criminal gangs."' 0 3 The Venezuelan government still claims that two-
thirds of the poor have been helped by their social policies, including
"missions" which offer education and health care, and giving up to two
million people small cash stipends. 10 4 This being said, inflation is still a
major problem despite efforts to increase the minimum wage and control
the prices of basic goods.10 5 Venezuela's economy is growing at 10 per-
cent a year, fueled by oil dollars and thirty-six billion in reserves, how-
ever, with high public spending, an 18.4 percent inflation rate, and
random food shortages, many fear that the growth could be derailed.106
On taking office for a third term, Mr. Chavez moved quickly to na-
tionalize a number of utilities and has set in motion another constitu-
tional reform. However, it is unclear whether a majority of voters
support the shift to greater state control. Opinion polls consistently
show that Mr. Chavez's support is based on his pro-poor policies and
the rise in real incomes in recent years, rather than ideological sup-
port for socialism. His drive to 'deepen the revolution' could poten-
tially erode support for the government, particularly if at the same
time the government fails to effectively address concerns such as
crime, corruption and housing, or if the economic environment dete-
riorates. That said, a cohesive opposition leadership is not currently
in sight.10 7
Recently, Chavez refused to renew the license of Radio Caracas Televi-
sion (RCTV), the country's most influential television station, because
the station has been openly hostile toward President Chavez.'0 8 RCTV
supported the coup against Chavez in 2002 and it refused to bend to gov-
ernment directives, Chavez's decision to shut it down "shows the outright
authoritarianism and arbitrary character of the Venezuelan leader."' 0 9
Chavez's decision to shut down RCTV also "reflects the ineffectiveness
of the mechanisms of control which, in democratic systems, balance and
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rectify possible abuses on the part of the executive branch." 110 Although
approximately 70 percent of the public was against the closing of RCTV,
it happened because of the void of any truly independent institutions in
Venezuela."1 In Venezuela, Chavez is impossible to escape; he is pic-
tured on billboards, posters, and murals, where he is seen "hugging chil-
dren, embracing old women, chanting slogans, and plugging energy
saving Cuban light bulbs into sockets."'112
The Bank of the South seems to be both indicative of and an exacerba-
tion of the current political climate of Latin America. It illustrates the
trend of rising nationalism and regionalism in Latin America as well as
the backlash against Washington-based lending institutions that seemed
to have done little to quash poverty in Latin America. It also demon-
strates the rift that has formed in Latin America between those countries
that still support the United States and those leftist leaders who follow
Chavez. As with most of Chavez's initiatives, the Bank of the South
would not be possible without oil money, demonstrating the rise of re-
source nationalism in South America generally, but in Venezuela particu-
larly giving Chavez the ability to economically dominate the South
American market and thus politically dominate Venezuela.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Simon Romero, Chavez Expected to Propose Removing his Term Limits, N.Y.
TIMES, August 15, 2007, § A.
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